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Settler Colonial Strategies and Indigenous Resistance on the Great Lakes Lumber Frontier 
Theodore J. Karamanski 
 
Introduction 
The geographic and economic setting of the nineteenth century Upper Great Lakes region 
created unique challenges to American settler colonialism and their encounters with the 
Iindigenous people of this land of lakes and forests.  Many Anishinaabeg bands responded 
creatively through the use of Christianity, education, and American law in an attempt to fortify 
their presence in the region.  European -Americans, who sought to appropriate the wealth of the 
Upper Midwest’s vast stands of hardwood and pine forests, only seldom needed to resort to guns 
to take control of the land.   Instead of a war of conquest they entangled Anishinaabeg property 
owners in a bewildering legal and extra-legal thicket that facilitated the plunder of the region’s 
most marketable resource. The initial phase of pine logging laid waste to Anishinaabeg property 
rights but left the indigenous population remaining on their traditional lands. The ill -treatment of 
Anishinaabeg landowners should have been a warning signal to policy makers in the 1880s 
seeking to reform national Indian policy through severalty. 
In his 2012 study of Great Lakes Indian history in the colonial and early national periods, 
historian Michael Witgen emphasizes the shared transregional society shared by the 
Anishinaabeg while at the same time documenting the “flexibility” and autonomy of action 
reserved to local bands.   This essay is concerned with the indigenous response to the lumber 
frontier’s variation of settler colonialism in the Upper Great Lakes region—--the heartland of the 
Anishinaabeg.   The bulk of the essay, however, is anchored in northern Lower Michigan with 
some inclusion of examples from northern Wisconsin and Minnesota.   The Odawa, Ojibwe, and 
Potawatomi in Lower Michigan—sometimes known as the Three Fires Confederacy and who all 
embraced the native name Anishinaabeg—did not respond to the intrusion of lumbering in the 
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same way as bands in other parts of the region. Yet the impact of the logging frontier on the 
indigenous people was, with rare exceptions, strikingly similar.1 
 
In the Wake of the “Middle Ground” 
What Richard White famously dubbed a “middle ground” of cooperation and cultural exchange 
that marked the Great Lakes frontier in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries endured after 
the conclusion of the second war with Great Britain.   The cultural forms and economic relations 
of that earlier period of French and British regimes in the region only slowly waned over several 
decades under American suzerainty.2   The latent military power of the indigenous people of the 
Great Lakes region together with the lingering possibility of their receiving support from British 
Canada inclined American officials and pioneer traders to follow for a time the previously 
                                                          
1 Michael Witgen, Infinity of Nations: How The Native New World Shaped Early North America (New 
YorkPhiladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p.19. Each of the tribal groupings included under the 
term Anishinaabeg speak a closely related and mutually intelligible language. The name Anishinaabeg has been 
translated variously to mean spontaneous people, first people or good people. I will use the term when describing 
the broad experience of many bands in the region or when describing mixed tribal groups. See, Basil Johnston, 
Ojibway Heritage (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p.15; William W. Warren, History of the Ojibway 
People (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1984), p.37. 
2 Richard White’s influential book The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republic in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650–-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) concludes with the War of 1812 yet subsequent 
scholars have demonstrated that the process of accommodation and the search for common meaning that White 
documented in an earlier period continued. See Keith R. Widder, Battle for the Soul: Metis Children Encounter 
Evangelical Protestants at Mackinaw Mission, 1823–-1837 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1999), 
Susan Sleeper-Smith, French Men and Indian Women: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001);, Theodore J. Karamanski, Blackbird’s Song: Andrew J. 
Blackbird and the Odawa People (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012); Anne F. Hyde, Empires, 
Nations, and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800–-1860 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2012). More recently in An Infinity of Nations Michael Witgen makes the case that strong Iindigenous 
sovereignty in the Great Lakes region lasted well  into the nineteenth century, a thesis better supported by events 
in Minnesota than further east in the region, such as in Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio. Michael McDonald in Masters 
of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2015) also takes issue with the 
concept of the Great Lakes as a “middle ground” and especially White’s characterization of the Anishinaabeg as a 
“shattered” people in the wake of the Iroquois wars as does Robert Michael Morrissey. See Michael McDonald, 
Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2015); Robert Michael 
Morrissey, in “The Power of the Ecotone: Bison, Slavery, and the Rise and Fall of the Grand Village of the 
Kaskaskia,” Journal of American History , Vol.102, nNo. 3 (Dec.ember, 2015),  p.667–-692. 
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established cultural norms.   This process did not take place in the area south of Lakes Erie and 
Michigan.   Here the old fur trade ways were swept away by a quickly rising tide of agricultural 
settlers.   Yet during the 1820s the Anishinaabeg of the northern Great Lakes faced no such 
direct pressure and were allowed time in which they could take stock of their relations with the 
American state and to initiate strategies of resistance and accommodation. 
      Several Anishinaabeg bands adopted bold strategies designed to both frustrate a United 
States    government intent on carrying -out the policy of Indian removal and to reposition their 
bands in the changing economy and politics of the ante-bellum era.   The United States 
government had a two-faced policy toward indigenous peoples.   On one hand, it was committed 
to the taking of Indian land in order to accommodate its swelling agricultural population, yet it 
also claimed to be committed to “civilizing” Indians so they could eventually be incorporated 
into the general population.   In 1821 Lewis Cass, the Governor of the Michigan Territory (which 
then embraced the entirety of the Upper Great Lakes region), visited the people of the region.   
Accompanying him was Reverend Jedidiah Morse who encouraged the Indians to accept 
Christian missionaries with the threat “Civilization or ruin.”   Faced with this pressure, two 
groups of Anishinaabeg, independent of each other, elected to embrace a path to “civilization,” 
but in such a way that it was under their control.   These were the Potawatomi in southwestern 
Michigan under the leadership of Leopold Pokagon and the Odawa in the Little Traverse Bay 
area of northwestern Michigan, under Apokisigan and Mackadepenessy. Spurning Protestant 
missionaries offered by the government, they solicited instead the assistance of the Roman 
Catholic Church.   In a series of petitions the Odawa Mackadepenessy sent to the Pope in Rome, 
the President of the United States, even the King of France, he specifically requested Jesuit 
missionaries.   In doing, this they were reviving a relationship that went back to the Jacques 
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Marquette, S. J. and the black robes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as 
making common cause with the French and Metis (mixed bloods) who still played a dominant 
role in the European -American commerce of the region.   At the same time they selected a 
branch of Christianity that was decidedly independent, almost at odds, with the settler state that 
threatened them.   By this path the Anishinaabeg could increase their access to a new source of 
sacred power, claim to have embarked on the path to civilization, yet also keep the United States 
government at bay. 3 
The embrace of Catholicism by several Anishinaabeg bands was calculated, but it would be 
wrong to see it as purely political.   In the wake of the War of 1812, the native people of the 
Great Lakes were in crisis.   Military means of defending their homeland had failed and the old 
fur trade economy was faltering.   A new source of spiritual power was needed as well as a new 
tactic to deal with the American state.   The marginal status of the Catholic Church allowed 
Indian leaders to control the pace of change.   So weak was the Catholic Church in Michigan in 
1823, the date of the first Odawa petitions, that there was only a single priest in the entire 
territory.   For several years the Odawa actually carried out a process of self-evangelization in 
which tribal lay ministers exposed to the new faith in the East taught prayers, built a chapel, and 
even began instruction in literacy. By the 1830s the Catholic Church in the United States was 
finally strong enough to send resident missionaries. Indigenous autonomy in the process, 
however, remained strong.   This was in part because among the Odawa, the missionaries sent by 
the Church came from Slovenia. They spoke, Latin, French, Slovenian, German, and worked to 
                                                          
3 John C, Shea, Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of the United States (New York: E. Dunigan & Brother, 
1854), p.383; James A. Clifton, The Pokagons, 1683–-1983: Catholic Potawatomi Indians of the St. Joseph River 
Valley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), p.66–-69; Petition of the Chiefs of the Ottawa Indians, 
Arbre Croche to the President of the United States, 12 August 1823, Chronological File, Manuscripts Division, 
Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison; Annales De L’Association De La Propagation De La Foi, vVol. 21, (Paris: La 
Librairie Ecclesiastique De Rusand, 1826) p.121–-35;  Karamanski, Blackbird’s Song, p. 36–-38. 
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become fluent in Anishinaabeg languages as well.   Their lack of English language skills and 
knowledge of America, however, limited their ability to meddle in the Odawa’s relations with 
the United States.   The embrace of Catholicism enabled the Pokagon band of Potawatomi to 
avoid their removal from the Michigan Territory. At the 1833 Treaty of Chicago they were 
excluded from the order to remove west and initially instructed to relocate among their co-
religious Odawa near Little Traverse. Later they received their own reservation in southern 
Michigan. The Odawa of Little Traverse used the 1836 Treaty of Washington to secure what 
were initially promised to be large permanent reservations in their homeland.   After they 
returned to Michigan, the Senate “revised” the agreement and limited their tenure there to a mere 
five-year period before removal.   Yet like the Pokagon, the Odawa were able to frustrate 
removal by using the funds received for the sale of their western Michigan estate to makeby 
making private land purchases.   Federal treaties also guaranteed the Anishinaabeg the right to 
hunt and fish on the ceded territory until it was “required for settlement.”   This proved important 
for the Odawa who were actively engaged in commercial fishing for America’s growing urban 
markets.   Many other Anishinaabeg bands, particularly those in southern Michigan, did not fare 
so well and suffered removal or simply outright dispossession.   The Ojibwe of Swan Creek, 
Black River, and Saginaw Bay in eastern Michigan were systematically stripped of their estate 
by a series of treaties between 1837 and 1838. Decimated by smallpox a small number accepted 
removal to Kansas while the remnant took refuge in a series of Methodist mission settlements.4 
                                                          
4 Petition of the Chiefs of the Ottawa Indians, Arbre Croche, August Aug. 12, 1823, Chronological Files, Manuscripts 
Division, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; P. Chrysostomus Verwyst, Life and Labors of St. Rev, 
Frederic Baraga (Milwaukee: M.H. Wilzius, 1900), 57; Andrew J. Blackbird, A History of the Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians of Michigan (Ypsilanti, MI: The Ypsilantian Job Printing House, 1887), p.31–-47; Clifton, The Pokagons, 
p.66–-69; Charmaine M. Benz, editored., Diba Jimooyung: Telling Our Story, A History of the Saginaw Ojibwe 
Anishinabek (Mt. Pleasant, MI: Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan and the Ziibiwing Cultural Society, 
2005), p.44–-51. 
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The Panic of 1837, which practically brought to a halt the settlement of Michigan by 
European -Americans, and the fact that the lands of central and northern Michigan were less 
attractive to agriculturalists than prairie tracts further west also played a role in allowing some 
indigenous people in to avoid removal.   The fact remained, however, that as the decade of the 
1840s ended Michigan, unlike other mMidwestern states such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, 
continued to have a large indigenous population.   Some like the Odawa in the northwest had 
their own land base and others like the Saginaw Ojibwe were largely landless and indigent.   The 
question of how the State of Michigan should deal with the populations left by the old fur trade 
era became an issue at a convention called in 1850 to draft a new Michigan constitution. 
Representatives from northern Michigan were determined that mixed-bloods who descended 
from Anishinaabeg and European relationships be recognized a citizens with full civil rights. 
They were a sizable portion of the community and a handful were among the leading business 
men and women in the region.   Therefore, when the 1850 constitution was approved, it included 
a clause stating that every “male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States and 
not a member of a tribe” be recognized as a citizen.   This carefully worded legal change became 
very broadly interpreted due to the activism of the Odawa Andrew J. Blackbird.   He was the 
educated son of Mackadepenessy whose petitions had first brought Catholic mission schools to 
Little Traverse Bay.   Blackbird lobbied the State Chief Justice, the governor, and the legislature 
to include not just mixed-bloods but all Indians wishing to be citizens.   It seems state officials 
saw this as a long-term solution to the state’s “Indian Problem.”   Blackbird even prevailed upon 
the legislature to send a formal resolution to Congress requesting that the federal government 
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make “arrangements” for the “permanent location” of the Anishinaabeg “in the northern part of 
this state.” 5 
The solution to the Indian problem in Michigan foreshadowed the Dawes Act approach the 
government would adopt three decades later.   In 1855 the federal government recognized 
Michigan Indian’s new civil status and the fact that removal was neither feasible nor desirable. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny negotiated a new series of treaties with the 
Anishinaabeg.   The 1855 Treaty with the Odawa and Ojibwe of northern Michigan created a 
series of reservations of public land from which tribal members could select family allotments of 
eighty acres. While Indians could occupy the land immediately upon selection, actual title to the 
land would be held in trust by the federal government for a period of ten years.   A similar treaty 
was made with the Saginaw area Ojibwe.   The treaties also set up a series of schools for Indian 
youths to be funded for ten years.   Once tribal land allotment was concluded, the areas set aside 
as reservations would be open to all interested buyers. It is significant and reflective of the 
optimism of Manypenny and indeed the State of Michigan that the trust period for these 
allotments was only set at ten years not the twenty-five later incorporated in the Dawes Act. 6 
With the 1855 treaties the federal government thought it had laid out a program by which it 
would be free of Indian responsibilities in Michigan within ten years. While Michigan remained 
the largest Indian agency in the country and it operated the largest government school system in 
the nation, the plan was for all trust responsibilities and treaty liabilities to end in ten years. At 
                                                          
5 Kenneth E. Lewis, West to Far Michigan: Settling the Lower Peninsula, 1815–-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2002), p. 112–-13; Susan E. Grey, The Yankee West: Community Life of the Michigan Frontier 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1996), p.47–-50, 72;  Michigan Statutes Annotated: Containing the 
Text of All General Laws of a Permanent Character in Force in Michigan, vVolume. 1 (Chicago: Callaghan, 1882), 
p.220; Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, 60–-61; Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan 
(Lansing: R.W. Ingalls, 1851), p.258–-59; Deborah Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race and 
Citizenship, 1790–-1880 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), p.128–-36. 
6 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Treaties, 1778–-1883 (New York: Interland Publishing, 1972),  p.727–-29, 733–-35; 
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that point the tribal status of the Odawa and Ojibwe would cease and they would simply be state 
citizens.   The Odawa and Ojibwe thereby successfully evaded the federal removal program.   
This was in part because of their strategic response to American pressure and in part because 
agriculturally focused American settler colonialism by-passed their homeland in favor of trans-
Mississippi prairie lands.   The greatest challenge for the Anishinaabeg, however, lay in front of 
them in the form of the European -American logging frontier. 
 
The Logging Frontier 
 Settler cColonialism is a transnational process by which an incoming population 
displaces the indigenous people and establishes their own sovereign regimes. In the words of the 
Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe “settler colonialism destroys to replace.”"   Like all 
forms of settler colonialism, the logging industry brought a transformative socioeconomic 
system, one that had been perfected in the forests of New England to the Great Lakes region. The 
logging frontier was a facet of European -American colonialism that was vastly different than the 
agriculturally based settlement system that succeeded in displacing indigenous people in the 
Ohio Valley and along the lower Great Lakes.   Lumbermen were like the fur traders that first 
encountered the Anishinaabeg in only one significant way, they were focused on acquiring a 
single resource from the Great Lakes environment, and they were content to destroy that 
resource in the process of acquiring it. 7  
                                                          
7  Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 
(Dec. 2006), 387–409. See also Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 17; Although the author does not deal with the lumber industry, for a treatment of settler 
colonialism in the Great Lakes region, see Bethel Saler, The Settler’s Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in 
America’s Old Northwest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
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Unlike the fur traders European -Americans interested in accessing logs for lumber did 
not require Indian labor to secureaccess this resource.   The Anishinaabeg had hunted furs for 
their own use for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans, and they brought to the trade the 
skills necessary to most efficiently acquire and process the desired product.   Although the 
indigenous people of the Great Lakes forest had prodigious wood working skills, logging on a 
commercial scale was not something that indigenous people practiced.   It brought a 
transformation of the environment they had not ever even imagined.   In Michigan as well as 
most of the Great Lakes region, Indians were drawn into participating in the lumber industry as 
lumberjacks and river drivers.   Indians who in the 1870s and 1880s took jobs as loggers did so 
out of a need for cash income following the loss of land tenure.   Some native communities even 
managed a number of small logging operations on their own, however, unlike the fur trade. it 
was Indian land not indigenous labor which was crucial to the economic enterprise. 8 
While both the fur trade and the lumber industry relied upon what European -Americans 
regarded as “wilderness” landscapes for their extractive pursuits, the lumber industry faced 
daunting logistical challenges as it sought to establish itself in the region.   The fur trade had 
been an ideal economy for a remote region since it revolved around the harvesting and transport 
of a light-weight, high-value product.   In contrast, the lumber industry focused on a heavy, 
unwieldy, product that was of commercial value only in large volume.   Removing timber from 
the forest, transporting to where it could be milled and getting it to a market was the economic 
challenge of the lumber industry as it moved into the Great Lakes region.   Since this 
                                                          
8  For Michigan Indian participation in logging see: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1875, 
p.294; George I. Betts to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 26 MarchMar. 26, 1874, National Archives, RG 75, M-234, 
Roll 411, p.46: John W. Fitzmaurice, The Shanty Boy or Life in a Lumber Camp (Cheboygan, MI: Democratic Steam 
Press, 1889), p.8; James McClurken, “Wage Labor in Two Michigan Indian Communities,” Native Americans and 
Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives, edited byed. Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1996), p.75–-79. 
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necessitated considerable capital investment, there were few industrial scale attempts at 
exploiting forest resources until treaties of cession had reduced indigenous title to the land of the 
Upper Great Lakes region. The lumber industry’s transformative socioeconomic system differed 
profoundly from agricultural settlement.   It brought only a small permanent population but 
required a broad appropriation of forest lands.   During the pine logging phase of the industry 
which began in the 1840s, accelerated in the 1860s, and climaxed in Lower Michigan in the 
1880s, temporary lumber camps were established in the interior to plunder the surrounding area 
and then after a season or two relocate to a new site.   Cut timber was floated downstream 
usually to lakeshore urban settlements where it could be milled and shipped by schooner to 
market. Lumbermen’s occupation of the land was fleeting but often devastating to the 
environment.   While agriculturalists usually planted homesteads with an eye to permanent 
occupation, lumbermen sought the main chance for the short -run.   The lumber industry 
variation on settler colonialism did not require the complete displacement of the indigenous 
population so long as forest resources could be appropriated.   Hence native people could persist 
in their homelands in spite of logging as long as their control over the forest was broken.   Even 
after pine logging was completed in a region, the lands remained integrated into the Anglo -
American settler state to be exploited for their hardwood trees and later for so-called “weed 
trees” for pulpwood, or to become hardscrabble cut-over farms.9 
                                                          
9 There were three basic phases through which the Great Lakes logging frontier progressed. The chronology is 
somewhat different for each state in the region as the industry basically moved west from Michigan, Wisconsin, to 
Minnesota. The first phase was pine and cedar logging because these softwoods floated and could be easily moved 
by water. They were also in great demand for balloon frame construction. Hardwood logging usually required 
railroads and came later followed by pulpwood logging eventually relying upon internal combustion engine 
equipment. For the phases of logging industry exploitation see: Theodore J. Karamanski, Deep Woods Frontier: A 
History of Logging in Northern Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989).  For more on the logistics of 
frontier logging see, Michael Williams, Americans and their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 193–-230; William Gerald Rector, Log Transportation in the Lake States Lumber Industry, 
1840–-1918 (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1953). 
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 The first industrial use of the forest resources of the Upper Great Lakes region was by the 
shipping industry.   In the 1840s more than 300 three hundred steamboats plied the Great Lakes 
carrying cargoes and settlers from the Erie Canal at Buffalo to Chicago and other points west. 
Mostly powered by wood, these vessels were required to make numerous stops to replenish their 
supply of fuel. Cordwood stations were set up all along the lakeshore by entrepreneurs who 
freely cut down trees on government or even unceded Indian land. Prior to the cession of their 
lands, Indians complained to federal authorities about this intrusion upon their resource base. In 
1834 the Odawa headman Pabanmitabi insisted “if any wood is cut upon our land …we should 
be paid for it.” The timber on islands and peninsulas was the easiest to exploit since it was 
adjacent to maritime transportation and many of those sites were denuded to feed steamship 
fireboxes. The habit of stealing timber only increased following the cession of most Indian land 
in Michigan in 1836. 10    
 From the middle to well after the turn of the nineteenth century, the Great Lakes region 
was caught up in a green gold rush in which timber created more millionaires than the California 
Gold Rush.   The value to come out of Michigan’s deep woods alone far outstripped the value to 
come from California gold mines between 1849 and 1900.   This logging frontier was shaped by 
the economics of harvesting and processing large amounts of standing timber into lumber. 
Lumbermen had four big expenses: the acquisition of standing timber, the cutting of the trees 
into logs, the transportation of the logs to the site of a mill, and milling of the logs into 
dimension lumber (to this could also sometimes be added the transport of the lumber to a 
market).   The opportunity for profit could be enhanced by reducing or eliminating the cost of 
any of those necessary steps.   The logging frontier’s particular brand of settler colonialism 
                                                          
10 Speech of Pabanmitabi, 18 AugustAug. 18, 1834, National Archives, Letters Received by the Superintendents, 
Michigan Superintendency, 1818–-1835, RG 75, M-1, Roll 69, p.79. 
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flowed out of lumberman’s inevitable conflict and occasional cooperation with Anishinaabeg.   
The logging frontier provided occasional employment of native people in cutting or floating logs, 
but also impinged upon usufruct rights, resulted in timber theft, and the fraudulent taking of 
Indian land.11 
 Pioneer logging ventures brought little benefit and some disruption to indigenous people. 
In the 1850s and 1860s Indian men were not considered competent to join the lumberjacks in 
felling and transporting trees. This seems to have stemmed from longstanding white fear and 
mistrust of Indians by European -Americans as well as the fact that few Anishinaabeg could 
speak English and, therefore, could not work effectively with logging crews.   It was not until the 
1870s and later that Indians with the necessary language skills began to join the shanty boys as 
sawyers, swampers, and river drivers.   What early logging brought to Indian country was a 
disruption of traditional subsistence practices.   Fish weirs that had been used and maintained for 
generations were often torn apart to clear rivers and streams for the spring log drive.   Those 
changes further compromised aboriginal subsistence by ruining spawning areas along rivers 
through siltation and changes in water temperature.   Berry patches and maple sugar groves could 
also be disrupted, especially in later years when hardwood trees were targeted by loggers.   In 
Wisconsin and Minnesota where wild rice that grew along the rivers was a critical part of the 
Anishinaabeg diet, loggers drowned the crop by raising water levels for log drives.   The Ojibwe 
sometimes respond to this by opening dams or even tearing them down, which brought 
                                                          
11 For the comparative value produced by the logging frontier see, “Green Gold,” Michigan Educational Portal for 
Interactive Content, http://www.michigan-history.org/greengold/GGEducatorNotes.html , accessed August, 2015. 
For more on the economics of the logging industry see, Joseph Zaremba, Economics of the American Lumber 
Industry (New York: R. Speller, 1963). F and for a more focused look at Michigan logging see Barbara E. Benson, 
“Logs and Lumber: The Development of the Lumber Industry in Michigan’s Lower Peninsula, 1837–-1870” (, Ph.D. 
dissertationdiss., Indiana University, 1976);, and Karamanski, Deep Woods Frontier. For an excellent study of how 
the Anishinaabeg of the Upper Peninsula of Michgan adapted to the logging industry in the early twentieth century 
see, Bradley J. Gillis,. Navigating the Landscape of Assimilation: The Anishnabeg, the Lumber Industry, and the 
Failure of Federal Indian Policy in Michigan, Michigan Historical Review Vol. 34, no.2 (Fall 2008): 57-74.   
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confrontations with the angry lumber men.   In 1854 the most serious of these disputes occurred 
over a logging dam at the source of Minnesota’s Rum River that destroyed wild rice grounds on 
Mille Lacs.   Following disputes that left two lumberjacks and one Ojibwe dead, the U.S. Army 
and the Minnesota governor intervened and eventually the Mille Lacs band received 
compensation for their crop loss.12 
 As the logging industry developed in the Great Lakes region, it was marked by a diversity 
of participants from small, poorly capitalized entrants into the trade to large-scale operators with 
vertically integrated corporations that captured all stages of production from the forest to mill 
and market.   Another crucial facet of logging was that it necessitated substantial up-front capital 
out lays before any profit could be accrued.   For example, a small operator attempting to enter 
the business, had to purchase timberlands, build a lumber camp, hire, equip, and feed a logging 
crew for four to five months, and move hundreds of large logs to a mill all before any profit 
could be realized.   That heavy burden of capital out lay encouraged logging operations to 
frequently seek illegal means to reduce cost.   The easiest way to do that, especially in the 1850s 
and 1860s when the region was sparsely inhabited was to cut logs on unpurchased, usually 
government, and sometimes Indian land.13 
 Timber stealing on public land began in the 1830s and grew to such sizeable portions in 
the 1850s that the Department of the Interior had to appoint agents to northern Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. They were charged with investigating cases of illegal logging, 
                                                          
12 James McClurken, “Wage Labor in Two Michigan Indian Communities,” Native Americans and Wage Labor: 
Ethnohistorical Perspectives, ed. Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 
75–79; Charles Cleland, “Preliminary Report of the Ethnohistorical Basis of the Hunting, Fishing, and Gathering 
Rights of the Mille Lacs Chippewa,” Fish in the Lakes, Wild Rice, and Game in Abundance: Testimony on Behalf of 
Mille Lacs Ojibwe Hunting and Fishing Rights, edited byed. James McClurken (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2000), p.76; Eileen M. McMahon and Theodore J. Karamanski, North Woods River: The St. Croix 
Valley in Upper Midwest History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009),  p.76–-77, 96–-97. 
13 Bensen, “Logs and Lumber,” p.3–-5. 
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confiscating the logs or lumber, and working with the United States District Attorney to 
prosecute the guilty parties.   In 1854 agent Isaac Willard took a small boat up the Lake 
Michigan shore from Grand Haven to past Manistee, Michigan, and he found innumerable 
trespasses upon the public lands.   Thirty-seven indictments followed including for violations of 
an Ojibwe reservation at Manistee.   The Indians had objected to the initial intrusion of the 
lumbermen, but the hungry members of the local band had been bought off with gifts of pork and 
flour.   The Ojibwe were less accommodating on Wisconsin’s St. Croix River when a group of 
warriors stopped a log drive with the notice “We have no money for logs; we have no money for 
land. Logs cannot go.”   Those words backed by an implicit threat of violence proved more 
effective than federal agent arrest warrants.   In what proved a foreshadowing of what was to 
come, ante-bellum agents in Michigan proved better at identifying timber thefts than stopping the 
practice. The federal agents were not able to secure the cooperation of local officials, ship 
owners, or even the compliance of the local community who saw their economic self-interest 
resting with the timber thieves.   Timber thefts only increased in succeeding decades, and by 
1879 it was such an issue that President Rutherford B. Hayes mentioned the problem in his State 
of the Union message and requested specific legislation to speed prosecution. While the federal 
government struggled to come to terms with timber thefts it did act as an agent for the logging 
industry in pushing for the Anishinaabeg to cede their lands in exchange for reservations. The St. 
Croix Ojibwe, who were among the first bands confronted with lumber industry expansion, were 
well aware the white men wanted their pine timber. In treaty negotiations with the United States 
they sagely proposed to cede their lands for the term of sixty years, “It is hard to give up the 
lands. They will remain and cannot be destroyed but you may cut down the trees and others will 
grow up.” The government, however, insisted on taking full title to their homeland. Sixty years 
15 
 
later the St. Croix valley was a devastated cutover and most of the lumbermen had moved further 
west.   14 
 
 
Logging and Anishinaabeg Land Loss 
 Even where Indian land tenure seemed to be under close federal supervision, lumbermen 
developed sophisticated methods of cheaply gaining control of tribal forest resources.   The 
lumber industry’s assault on the Saginaw Ojibwe’s reservation in central Michigan illustrates 
these tactics.   In 1855 parts of six townships were reserved for the Ojibwe to make allotment 
selections and land purchases.   Allotments were supposed to take place in 1855 and 1856 and 
then the Indians were to have a decade of federal stewardship to protect their title to the land. 
Instead, multiple agents so bungled the allotment process that a decade later there was no 
certainty who owned what land.   Several times allotment took place, but lists were either poorly 
recorded or lost before they could make their way to Washington.   It was not until 1870 and 
1871 that the Michigan Anishinaabeg received federal patents on their land.   By this time the 
Michigan lumber industry was the most powerful political and economic force in the state.   In 
Washington the lumber men used their influence with the Office of Indian Affairs to have the 
majority of Ojibwe allotees ruled as “competent” and, therefore, able to own and sell their land 
                                                          
14 Isaac W. Willard to Robert McClelland, Secretary of the Interior, 18 FebruaryFeb. 18, 1854, House Document 
nNo. 15,  House Documents, Otherwise Published as Executive Documents: Thirteenth Congress, second session 
(Washington, DC: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1854), 11–17; Jennifer Herman, “Manistee,” Michigan Encyclopedia (St. Clair 
Shores, MI: Somerset Publishers, 1999), p.383; “The Nation: Annual Message of the President to Congress Not 
Assembled,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 30, 1879; McMahon and Karamanski, North Woods River, p.77; W.H.C. Folsom, 
Fifty Years in the Northwest, ed. E. E. Edwards (1888 reprint; Taylor’s Falls, MN: Taylors Falls Historical Society, 
1999), 99; “Treaty with the Chippewa, 1837,” Indian Treaties, 1778–-1883, Edited byed. Charles J. Kappler (New 
York: Interland, 1972), 491–92; Charles E. Cleland, “Preliminary Report of the Ethnohistorical Basis of Hunting, 
Fishing, and Gathering Rights of the Mille Lacs Chippewa,” Fish in the Lakes, Wild Rice, and Game in Abundance, 
ed. James M. McClurken (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 31. 
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without federal oversight.   The Office of Indian Affairs ruled the trust time had lapsed and local 
agents were given the authority to determine who was “competent.”   Most new land owners 
were declared “competent” and immediately set upon by lumbermen offering to buy their land or 
the right to cut their timber.   Some Ojibwe committed to farming accepted the offer to have their 
timber cut in order to clear the land and to raise capital to buy livestock, seed, and build a home. 
Others went to their allotments only to find that the timber had already been cut by loggers who 
had purposely cut what was known as a “round forty”—a practice in which loggers operating 
legally on say a forty acre track would purposely stray on to the adjoining land and denude it of 
timber.   All too often such operators moved on before they could be brought to justice.   Yet 
worse abuse was to come.15       
 The Methodist Church had done much to help the Saginaw Ojibwe adjust and even 
rebound from the land loss of the treaty era and the collapse of the old fur trade economy.   Yet 
that institution was also deeply involved in the politics of nineteenth century Michigan.   For two 
decades the Methodist Church all but had a hammer lockhammerlock on the Michigan Indian 
Agency.   Long before the celebrated “Peace Policy of General Grant” most agents were 
Methodist ministers or elders in the Church whose selection was approved by the Church.   Some 
of the agents were well-meaningwell meaning if not especially competent, some were corrupt 
and in league with some of the leading lumbermen in the region.   In 1868–-1869 Reverend 
George Bradley received payments from lumbermen for convincing his Indian congregation to 
                                                          
15 The federal action declaring unprepared Anishinaabeg “competent” to sell their allotments was another example 
of where Michigan Indian policy foreshadowed the abuses of the Dawes Act era. J. Usher to J. Edmunds, 2 
DecemberDec. 2, 1864, Petition of Frederick Hall, 40th Fortieth Congress, 3rd Secessionthird session, House of 
Representatives, Misc. Document nNo. 40, January, 1869; George Bradly to Eli Parker, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, 4 NovemberNov. 4, 1869, National Archives, M-234, Roll 408: p.894–-897; Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, 1870 (Washington, DCD.C.: Government Printing Office, 1870), p.780;  Benz, editored., Diba 
Jimooyung: Telling Our Story, A History of the Saginaw Ojibwe Anishinabek, p.60- –64.For the practice of cutting a 
“round forty” see Karamanski, Deep Woods Frontier, p.99–-100. 
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sell the timber rights on their allotments at prices well -below market value and did so even 
before the allotment process was completed.   He was later elevated to the office of Indian 
Agent.   Even worse was the career of Reverend George Betts who served as Indian Agent from 
1871 to 1876.   Betts entered into a lucrative partnership with a cabal of local lumbermen. As 
agent Betts issued allotments to Indians within the Isabella reservation, declared them 
“competent,” then he would immediately pass on the information to lumbermen who could target 
the new land owners.   Many were unaware of how valuable good pine tracts were.   One Ojibwe 
who had been declared “competent” sold his timber for fifteen dollars$15 to a lumberman who 
later laughed that the trees were worth $4,000.   Even more effective at turning over reservation 
land to the lumbermen was Betts’s practice of issuing patents to non-existent or deceased 
individuals.   Perhaps as many as four -hundred such patents were issued leading to the 
immediate plundering of the valuable timber on the land.   Complaints about Betts’s corruption 
began to pile up in Washington within a year of his taking office, yet no official investigation 
took place until January 1876.   He was eventually terminated and several thousand acres of land 
were returned to the reservation, however, Betts never faced criminal charges and he escaped 
with a small fortune.16    
 An important part of the lumbermen’s tactics to defraud the Ojibwe was complicity by 
their fellow tribesmen.   John Irons, a Methodist preacher and tribal member, was an active agent 
of the lumber companies.   Another Ojibwe John M. Collins used his position as the official 
interpreter on the Isabella reservation to promote Betts’s bogus allotments to the local chiefs.   
His deal with local logger Irving Arnold netted Collins fifteen dollars$15 for every allotment he 
                                                          
16 Edward C. Kemble, Special Inspector, Office of Indian Affairs to J. Q. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 22 
FebruaryFeb. 22, 1876, National Archives, H-211, document 2946; Warranty Deed, Caw-bay-quomo-quay to Peter 
Andre, 15 Jan. 15,uary 1878, Andre Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Benz, 
editored., Diba Jimooyung: Telling Our Story, A History of the Saginaw Ojibwe Anishinabek, p.65–-68. 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Word underline
18 
 
helped Arnold purchase.   A number of the Isabella reservation chiefs were aware of Betts’s 
wrong doing yet still supported him in petitions to Washington that helped to delay the agent’s 
removal from office.   Both Betts and the ring of timber agents who profited off reservation land 
were skillful at using intra-tribal rivalries and factions to gain the cooperation of Ojibwe leaders. 
Leaders who one year might complain to Washington about the loss of tribal land could be 
turned the next year when frustration over government inactivity prompted them to join the rush 
for profit. In 1878 Chief James Nauckchegame altered the Office of Indian Affairs to a large 
timber trespass on Indian land.   He provided an exact legal description of the tract and named 
the individual guilty of the timber theft.   After nothing was done, it is little wonder that 
Naukchegame entered into a cooperative arrangement with one of the worst timber thieves. 
Ojibwe lived in a gold rush atmosphere heated by a post-Civil War culture of corruption that 
permeated the towns around the reservation with most prominent white men guilty of breaking or 
manipulating the law with impunity.   Nonetheless, it was the Ojibwe who profited least and 
suffered most from the lumber men’s swindles.   By 1876, through a process that was a largely 
fraudulent, only a few thousand acres of the more than 92,000 acres that had been set aside as the 
Isabella Ojibwe Reservation remained in Indian hands.17  
 The tactics employed by lumber frontier settlers toward the Saginaw Ojibwe were also 
applied to the Odawa in western Michigan.   The Grand River Odawa had been given a large 
reservation in Oceana County from which to make individual allotments.   Less than one year 
after four -hundred patents had been issued to these people one timber land speculator had 
already bought up more than six -thousand acres of land.   The Odawa were actually in a worse 
                                                          
17 Kemble to Smith, 22 FebruaryFeb. 22, 1876; Petition of the Saginaw Chiefs to Columbus Delano, Secretary of the 
Interior, 11 June 11, 1872, National Archives, H-211, document 5439; Andrew Saw-wa-bon, Johnson Naw-be-tunf, 
James Nock-che-go-me, and Lyman Bennett to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, n.d. received in Washington, D.C. 
22 JuneJune 22, 1878, National Archives, RG 75, M-234, Roll 413, p.730–-732.  
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situation than the Ojibwe.   The later had been able to negotiate a Treaty in 1864 that allowed 
children upon reaching maturity to continue to take allotments as long as there was land 
available with the Isabella reserve.   The Odawa, however, were limited to allotments granted to 
the generation that signed the 1855 treaty with the United States even though the reserves created 
had much more available land.   In the 1860s and 1870s the Odawa pressed the government to 
allow the next generation to also claim allotments.   Finally, in 1872 Congress addressed the 
issue.   Odawa who came of age after the 1855 treaty would be given a six month window of 
opportunity to claim 160 acres each within either the Oceana County reserve or ones at Grand 
Traverse Bay or Little Traverse Bay.   However, these lands were not allotments.   Instead the 
land was to be taken under the terms of the Homestead Act which required that claimants dwell 
on and improve their property for five years before they could be awarded a fee-simple patent. 
Failure to improve the property or to dwell there could result in a loss of the claim.   The 1872 
law was sponsored by Senator Thomas Ferry who was in league with the lumbermen of the 
Grand River Valley.   Their interests were well served by the provision in the law that opened the 
Odawa reserves to European -American purchase and settlement once the six-month homestead 
window closed.   That same year a railroad connected Little Traverse Bay with the national rail 
network making the timber resources all the more valuable.   Lumbermen were by no means 
content with merely being able to purchase the bulk of the timberlands within the Odawa 
reserves.   Rather they set about designing tactics to seize the newly claimed Odawa 
homesteads.18 
                                                          
18 Benz, editored., Diba Jimooyung: Telling Our Story, A History of the Saginaw Ojibwe Anishinabek, p.64; Senate 
Bill 1035, A Bill for the Restoration to Market of Certain Lands in Michigan, 42nd Forty-second Congress, 2nd 
Sessionsecond session, June 10,10 June 1872, A Century of Law Making for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional 
Documents and Debates, 1774–-1875, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=42/llsb042.db&recNum=3251, accessed May, 2010; “Michigan Indians,” 
Chicago Tribune, July 16, July 1873. 
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 The results were particularly devastating for the Little Traverse Odawa.   Since the 1820s 
they had followed a path of resistance through accommodation toward the United States. 
Through alliances with the Catholic Church and mixed-blood business men in the Mackinac 
Straits area, they had gradually become Christianized. They could read and write text based on a 
syllabary in their own Anishinaabeg language, and many had become successful participants in 
the regional economy through commercial fishing and maple sugar harvesting.   This was an 
accommodation to the new European -American economy in the region but one that allowed for 
continued traditional activities such as pursuit of the seasonal cycle of movement across the land. 
Band member Andrew J. Blackbird had played a significant role in lobbying the State of 
Michigan to recognize Indians as citizens while still protecting their treaty rights.   Beginning in 
1856 the Little Traverse Odawa began the work of running the recently created Emmet County, 
Michigan.   Educated Indians were elected to positions as deputy sheriff, township supervisor, 
and in Blackbird’s case register of deeds and probate judge and in later years as county treasurer 
and sheriff.   Almost overnight the Little Traverse band went from being wards of the federal 
government to masters of their own Michigan local government.   Indian Agent Henry Gilbert 
wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Odawa “have an organized county and with 
some help manage to get along with their business.”   During the Civil War Odawa young men 
had served with distinction in the First Michigan Sharpshooters.   But in the wake of that conflict 
northern Michigan was transformed by a rising tide of white settlers In 1870 the Odawa made up 
ninety-five percent of the population of the county and their allotments were still protected in 
federal trust.   By 1880 there were 5,500 more whites than Indians and most allotments were 
removed from trust protection.    The majority of the newcomers were tied to the growing lumber 
industry as Michigan surged to the forefront in national lumber production.   As the number of 
21 
 
European -Americans grew, the number of Odawa elected to public office shrunk, their role in 
public life gradually disappeared, and their lands, both allotments and homesteads were in 
danger.19 
 In the late 1870s the newcomers began a systematic assault on Odawa lands.   Andrew 
Blackbird was drawn into a desperate defense of their individual holdings.   During the 1860s 
Blackbird had served as the local representative of the Office of Indian Affairs.   He had been 
educated at Twinsburg Academy in Ohio and at Michigan State Teachers College.   Although in 
the 1870s he did not hold an official position either in the government or tribe, many Odawa 
turned to him when trouble arose with the European -Americans.   Particularly vulnerable were 
Odawa who had taken homesteads within the Little Traverse reserve.   A particularly poignant 
case was that of Lucy Penaseway, an Odawa widow with four young children.   She had built a 
comfortable cabin on her claim, planted a garden and the beginnings of an orchard.   In late 
summer she and her children left their claim for several weeks to pick berries as was the Odawa 
tradition.   When she returned, she found a white family living in her house using her furniture. 
The white family were stand-ins for what the press called “land sharks” or “timber sharks.”   
They looked for vulnerable Indian claims then approached the Traverse City Land Office clerks 
to file their own claim on the land on the grounds that the Indians had abandoned it.   This would 
necessitate a public hearing.   The land office would print a notice of the hearing in the Grand 
Traverse Herald.   Federal regulations also stipulated that notice of a hearing was to be 
“personally served” when “practicable.”   A well placed bribe could ensure that such a personal 
                                                          
19 Emmet County Supervisor’s Journal, 1859–-1863 and Statement of Votes, 1855–-1869, Office of Emmet County 
Clerk, Petoskey, Michigan; Henry Gilbert to Commissioner Manyoneypenny, Dec. 26, 26 December 1856, National 
Archives, RG 75, Letters Received by the Michigan Superintendency, M-234, Roll 405, p.226. For more on Odawa 
and Ojibwe service in the Civil War see Raymond J. Herek, These Men Have Seen Hard Service: The First Michigan 
Sharpshooters in the Civil War (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998). 
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notice was not “practicable” and an Odawa homestead could be lost without the owner ever 
knowing.   Blackbird tried to intervene of Lucy Penaseway’s behalf.   He got the Indian Agent to 
appeal to the Department of the Interior, yet while the matter worked its way through the 
bureaucracy, the “timber sharks” had the tract stripped of all its merchantable timber.   Indian 
Agent George Lee could only complain that Penaseway’s shabby treatment was “as bad as the 
most heartless treatment of ex-slaves of the South.”   In another case, two Odawa Civil War 
veterans lost their homestead claim because they did not have the funds to travel in the dead of 
winter with witnesses the seventy miles to the hearing.20  
 Nor did Indian allotments escape the “timber sharks” attention.   Local government that 
had once been under Odawa control was turned into a tool for land seizures.   The Odawa held 
land under a variety of tenure regimes.   Some held allotments from which the federal trust 
period had expired.   Others were private property owners of tracts purchased decades before 
with funds from the original 1836 land cession, while still others claimed land under the 1862 
Homestead Act.   For all of these Indian citizens property tax rates soared as European -
Americans occupied public office.   Certainly the developing region had a growing need for road 
improvements and an expanded public education system.   Yet under the Odawa administration 
of the county the annual tax on eighty acres of unimproved forest land was only one dollar.   
Under the newcomers the fee jumped to $32.85. The need to raise cash to pay this hefty fee 
pushed some Odawa to seek wage labor and others to abandon their allotments altogether.   
Margaret Boyd, Andrew Blackbird’s sister, complained to President Ulysses S. Grant that the 
steep assessments were designed solely to “take our Lands away from us poor Indians.”   Boyd 
                                                          
20 Andrew Blackbird to George W. Lee, Indian Agent, May 12, May 18, May 21, 1877, National Archives, RG 75, 
Letters Received by the Michigan Superintendency, 1877–1879, Box 3; Bruce A. Rubenstein, “Justice Denied: An 
Analysis of American Indian–White Relations in Michigan, 1855–1889” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 
1974), 118–20; John O. Shomin to George Lee, Jan. 4, 1877, National Archives, M-234, Roll 412, 0133. 
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who had been educated at a Catholic convent school took the extraordinary step of making the 
“long and bitter journey” to appeal personally to the President.   In Washington she met with the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and was briefly ushered into Grant’s office before being quickly 
passed off to Julia Dent Grant.   Boyd felt she failed in her mission but her visit and her brother’s 
letters did prompt the government to dispatch a Department of the Interior investigator.   Edwin 
J. Brooks of the General Land Office reviewed fifty-two cases at the Traverse City office.   In the 
overwhelming majority of the cases he found the Odawa had been “grossly imposed upon.”21 
 Federal officials investigating the land frauds against the Odawa received little 
cooperation from local authorities.   Instead, they encountered undisguised hostility toward the 
Odawa.   The leading men of the community believed it was justifiable to “use very means 
possible” to “dispose them of their lands.”   It was considered standard practice to snare Indians 
in debt through the sale of luxury items or the extension of credit at usury rates, to threaten 
property owners with violence, or simply to trick Indians into signing quit-claim deeds.   Others 
waited and watched like wolves to pick -off the weak.   One speculator pointed to an Indian land 
owner and told investigator Edwin Brooks he “will be hard up next winter then I can buy his land 
at my own figures.”   These actions and the hostility they revealed deeply discourage Andrew 
Blackbird.   He had married an English woman and had mixed-blood children.   For years he 
worked as an interlocutor between whites and Indians.   Yet he was shocked by the “great 
antipathy and prejudice” that was rampant “which makes us feel we have no country now which 
we might call our own.”   He despaired when he was unable to successfully defend his brother’s 
farm from seizure or his sister from an outrageous law suit.   Blackbird was barely able to hold 
                                                          
21 Margaret Ogabejigokwe to President Grant, 7 January 1877, National Archives, RG 75, Letters Received, M-234, 
Roll 412, p.0469; S. E. Waite, Old Settlers of the Grand Traverse Region (Traverse City: S. E. Waite, 1918), p.51; 
Edwin Brooks to Commissioner Hayt, Jan. 44 January, 12 Jan. 12,uary 1878, National Archives, RG 75, Letters 
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, M-234, Roll 413, p. 0054. 
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on to his allotment when a prominent land speculator attempted to file a cross claim on the 
property. Blackbird was left to fume about the “sharp Lawyer thieves” who ensured that in a 
local court “an Indian has no chance for justice.”22    
 Michigan Indian agents were ineffective in protecting Native American land from lumber 
company plunder.   Indeed, several agents were active in profiting from the plunder. Even those 
who meant well and made an ethical effort were frustrated by the sheer size of the agency they 
supervised.   The ten -thousand or so Indians in Michigan lived in widely separated reserves 
across the northern portion of the state while the agency was headquartered in Detroit. Usually 
the agent visited each agency only once a year, otherwise they monitored developments through 
correspondence from the Indians.   All too often they responded to complaints bureaucratically 
by passing the issue on to Washington and awaiting instructions.   In 1888 the Anishinaabeg 
made an effort to have one of their own appointed as the agent.   Two candidates were put 
forward.   Reverend John Rix Robinson, an Odawa mixed-blood with experience on the Isabella 
Reserve, would have continued the Methodist Church’s lock on the office.   Andrew J. Blackbird 
had twice been employed by the Office of Indian Affairs before, and he had the support of the 
local Women’s National Indian Association.   Blackbird who seems to have had the inner track 
hoped to give “a good shaking to those robbers of the region.”   The Michigan Congressional 
delegation was under considerable pressure caught between supporters of the Indians and the 
lumber interests. The latter found a way to relieve the burden.   No agent was appointed, instead 
without even consulting the Office of Indian Affairs, Congress simply defunded the Michigan 
                                                          
22 Brooks to Hayt, Jan. 44 January, Jan. 12, 12 January 1878; Blackbird to Lee, Jan. 20, 20 January 1879, National 
Archives, RG 75, Letters Received, Box 3; Blackbird to Lee, Letters Received, Box 4; Rubenstein, Justice Denied, 
p.121; Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa, p.44; Blackbird to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mar. 29, 
29 March 1886, National Archives, RG 75, Correspondence of the BIA, 1880–-1907, Box 298. Blackbird’s sister, 
Margaret Boyd, was sued for several hundred dollars by a white resident of Harbor Springs, Michigan, who claimed 
he was gored by an ox she owned in spite of no witnesses and no evidence the ox was hers. 
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Agency.   It was a bitter blow to educated Anishinaabeg like Blackbird who trusted that 
government could yet make things right.23 
 What happened to the Ojibwe and Odawa in Michigan was by no means unique.   The 
Ojibwe in Wisconsin and the Anishinaabeg on the Canadian side of the border experienced a 
similar process.   James T. Gregory, the federal Indian agent in northwestern Wisconsin, openly 
facilitated the logging of the Bad River reserve.   That should not have surprised anyone since 
prior to his appointment he had been an employee of the Superior Lumber Company in Ashland, 
Wisconsin, and that his appoint was in response to vigorous lobbying by said company which 
then went on to mill most of the timber cut on the reservation.   When complaints that the 
reservation was being plundered of its only valuable asset roused a Congressional investigation, 
Gregory argued that the rapid cutting of Ojibwe timber was a positive good because it sped the 
way for those people’s “civilized improvement.”   What is striking in retrospect is the similarity 
of abuse that occurred across the entire broad sweep of the Great Lakes forests.   Indeed the 
process of dispossession that occurred among Saginaw Ojibwe was eerily similar to what 
historian Melissa Meyer documented occurred at the Ojibwe White Earth Reservation in far 
northern Minnesota during the first two decades of the twentieth century.   Sadly the nearly half 
century of time between the Saginaw and White Earth tragedies had done nothing to enlighten 
Indian policy.24 
 
                                                          
23 Karamanski, Blackbird’s Song, p.210–-12. 
24 Edmund Jefferson Danziger, Jr., Great Lakes Indian Accommodation and Resistance During the Early Reservation 
Years, 1850–-1900 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), p.76–-77; Danziger, The Chippewas of Lake 
Superior (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 102; “Robbing the Indians: Further Investigations of the 
Wisconsin Timber Thefts,” Chicago Tribune, 24 MarchMar. 24, 1888; United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 1888 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1889), p. xl–-xlviii; Melissa L. Meyer, The White Earth Tragedy: Ethnicity and 
Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabe Reservation, 1889–-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 
p.137–-169.  
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Lumber Frontier Colonialism in Perspective 
 The logging frontier’s expansion into Anishinaabeg lands was facilitated by a broad 
failure of both federal resource management and Indian policy.   Across the Great Lakes and 
Upper Mississippi regions of the Midwest, the allotment policy was carried out with the 
expectation that Indians would use the land as agriculturalists.   Save for isolated tracts, however, 
the forested lands of the region were not suited to subsistence agriculture.   The experience of 
European n-American settlers in New England and parts of up-state New York should have been 
an example of how problematic it was to develop forest farms.   The task of clearing timber was 
formidable, and it ensured that these lands were the most expensive to settle.   When loggers cut 
timber on land, it was not really cleared as they inevitably left behind stumps, dense piles of 
branches, and thin tree tops that became a great fire hazard. All too often allotment tracts were 
on sandy, shallow soiled areas with stands of pine that could never pay as farms. When 
deciduous forest lands with deep black soil were claimed by Anishinaabeg, they were often 
managed for small-scale maple sugar production.   Old growth forests of pine, cedar, and 
hardwoods gave the land it’s most marketable value, but the Office of Indian Affairs made no 
provisions for helping Indians to manage large stands of valuable timber.   The very process of 
subdividing reservations through severalty made it impossible to manage the exploitation of 
forests as a sustaining tribal resource.   The opening of reservation lands to white purchase was 
an invitation for the “timber sharks” to feed.    
The Menominee Indians in Wisconsin and the Ojibwe at Red Lake in Minnesota were 
unique in their ability to withstand pressure from both local lumbermen and the U.S. Congress to 
sell off the tribe’s timber rights and subdivide their reservation.   The Menominee avoided this 
with the help of William T. Richardson, the agent at Green Bay. The Menominee set up their 
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own Indian lumber camp and gradually cut and later milled the reservation lumber themselves 
and did so in a sustained way.   The Red Lake band were only able to avoid allotment by 
surrendering four-fifths of their reservation.   The ceded portion was quickly logged over, but the 
remaining Red Lake reservation was protected as a tribal estate and eventually selectively logged 
by tribally owned mills.   The Menominee and Red Lake examples suggest the transformational 
role that could be played by conscientious Indian Agents and united, determined tribal 
leadership.   In most of the region, however, this did not happen and instead there was a rapid 
cutting of first the best pine and later the hardwood timber, a process that took only a generation, 
followed by the gradual harvesting of the rest of the forest for cordwood or pulpwood which 
continued well into the twentieth century.   Federal timber agents were no more able to protect 
trees on federal land than federal Indian agents were able to protect Anishinaabeg forest lands.   
A program of wasteful plunder was the result. With homesteads lost and allotments logged over 
the best the Anishinaabeg could expect from the logging frontier was occasional employment in 
lumber camps.25 
  In the wake of the logging frontier, the entire region tried to cope with a radically 
transformed forest ecology that took the creation of county, state, and national forests to 
gradually restore.   Those forest reserves saw a return of a vast portion of the land in the region 
to government ownership.   It is ironic that a policy based on weaning the Indians from collective 
to individual private property was replaced, beginning with the 1911 Weeks Act, with a federal 
policy in which government reassumed collective control of some of the very same lands.   The 
                                                          
25 Patricia K. Ourada, The Menominee Indians: A History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), p.146–-
47.; s See also Brian Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the 
Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), p.36–-63;  and David M. 
Beck, The Struggle for Self-Determination: History of the Menominee Indians since 1854 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2007), p.1–-22; Anton Treuer, Warrior Nation: A History of the Red Lake Ojibwe (St. Paul: 
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2015), p.109–-117. 
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ethic behind the public forest system was to manage timberlands for the common good.   Within 
a single generation tribal communal ownership was decried as barbaric and replaced with private 
property which resulted in waste and ruin and had to be replaced by a new system of communal 
ownership.   There was, however, a significant difference in this new land management regime. 
State and federal forests included a regulatory regime that controlled Indian access to the land 
especially hunting, fishing, and gathering activities.   In the wake of the logging frontier, the 
Anishinaabeg faced greatly reduced opportunities to exercise traditional subsistence practices.26 
 Both the European Americans and indigenous people of the Great Lakes forest region 
were essentially caught in the colonial grip of urban America.   Lumbermen, who successfully 
fought off government regulation of forest lands, trumpeted the power and rationality of the free 
market.   Yet there was little that was fair or rational in the way the lumber market functioned. 
Financial capital based in Detroit, Milwaukee, but especially Chicago, controlled the harvesting 
of the natural capital represented in the forest.   A dependable lumber market like Chicago, the 
largest in the world by 1870, was essential to turn “green gold” into bankable dollars.   Most 
Great Lakes region logging companies had a partner based in Chicago or another major city to 
handle marketing and to arrange the annual financing of operations.   Because Chicago drew logs 
from throughout the region, it was a buyer’s market with prices set low.   Yet lumbermen 
embraced the market there because their desperate need for cash brought them to where lumber 
could be sold fast and in large volume.   The urban market manipulated lumbermen in the region 
just as they manipulated Indian allotments to their advantage.    This type of unequal relationship 
                                                          
26 There is a long history of Odawa and Chippewa resistance to state and federal fish and game regulations based 
upon their understanding of the rights secured by nineteenth century treaties. Those rights were the subject of a 
series of lawsuits in federal district court from the 1970s to the early twenty-first century. For more on this, see, 
Robert Doherty, Disputed Waters: Native Americans and Great Lakes Fishing (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky Press, 1990);  and Larry Nesper, Walleye War: The Struggle For Ojibwe Spearfishing and Treaty Rights 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).   
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was at the core of colonial economics, as was the disparity in living standards that flowed from 
it. The rugged conditions of the lumber camp, saw mill, or homestead tract—white or Indian, 
were in stark contrast to the mansions enjoyed by lumber barons and commission merchants in 
the city.   That inequality only increased over time as the lumber industry transformed the 
mMidwestern forest into what was by the early twentieth century the Great Lakes cutover region: 
the devastated and denuded northern third of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. 27 
 The colonialism of the logging frontier differed significantly from the settler colonialism 
that forced the removal of most of the indigenous people of the lower Midwest.   Lumbermen 
were less interested in Indian land than they were in the resources that were on the land.   Once 
timber was cut from land swindled from Indians, it was often abandoned by lumbermen and 
allowed to return to the state as a tax foreclosure or sold to poor farmers duped into thinking the 
cut-over had agricultural promise. The civil rights of citizenship and land ownership that leaders 
such as Mackadepenessy and Andrew Blackbird fought to achieve did not protect the Odawa and 
Ojibwe allotments from being plundered.   This sad state of affairs had been well -documented 
by 1880 in the press and in the reports of federal officials.   Nonetheless, in 1887 the alleged 
Friends of the American Indian pushed through Congress the General Allotment Act that would 
apply nearly same policy that failed in Michigan to Indians in Minnesota and in the western 
United States.   Michigan had two decades of experience with allotment, Indian citizenship, and 
Indian land loss yet that example was willfully ignored. 
 The pine logging frontier was a white-capped wave that washed over the northern Great 
Lakes region in little more than a generation.   When it had crested, European -American 
                                                          
27 For a discussion of internal colonialism see, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National 
Development," , Studies in Comparative International Development (1965) vol. 1, no. 4, p. 27–37. For the 
economic organization of the Great Lakes lumber industry see William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and 
the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991),  p.148–-199. 
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settlement to some extent receded leaving ghost towns and shrunken, economically challenged 
communities in its wake.   The Anishinaabeg remained.   Catholic parishes and Methodist 
congregations and camp meetings helped to sustain a people left largely impoverished by the 
failure of federal Indian policy.   Those core vessels of community remained useful tools of 
resistance that helped to sustain pride, tradition, education and in the twentieth century produced 
leaders who reestablished tribal sovereignty and an Indian role in determining how the resources 
of the region are managed.    
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